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3 
Shareholder Inspection Rights in China:  
An Empirical Inquiry  
 




Drawing upon overseas experiences, notably the U.S., China introduced 
the legal regime for shareholder inspection rights in its first national 
company law and over the years, has gradually developed more detailed rules 
and made amendments intended to better suit the local conditions.  Apart 
from written law, this paper also conducts an empirical study of how the law 
has been applied in practice, by examining relevant cases adjudicated from 
2012 to 2017.  The empirical findings show that China’s shareholder 
inspection rights have some distinctive features, and there are similarities 
and differences between China and the U.S. (as represented by Delaware).  
Despite the different types of agency problems in corporate governance 
between China and the U.S., shareholder inspection rights are similarly 
useful in mitigating informational asymmetry and facilitating shareholder 
engagement.  Some of the differences, such as those on the number and types 
of subsequent litigation, can be explained by the different patterns of 
corporate governance strategies as well as different corporate litigation 
regimes between the two jurisdictions.  This paper also reveals that there are 
some significant differences in the key elements of the legal framework for 
shareholder inspection rights between the two jurisdictions and based on this, 
sets out improvement suggestions for China. 
 
Keywords: shareholder inspection rights, access to corporate 
documents, informational asymmetry, corporate governance, China  
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I.  Introduction 
 
The term “shareholder inspection rights” refers to an important type of 
shareholder right, which gives the shareholders access to relevant documents 
in their company.  As a result of the separation of ownership and 
management, the shareholders, particularly those in large or public 
companies, are not involved in the daily operation of their company and thus 
the management (and actual controllers of the company) may have incentives 
to behave opportunistically to the harm of the shareholders.  Hence, it is 
important to empower the shareholders to inspect corporate documents, so 
they can obtain relevant information to monitor the company’s performance, 
engage in corporate governance matters, and determine whether and how to 
take proper action such as a proxy fight to replace the incumbent 
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management team or a derivative suit against directors and others who cause 
harm to the company.   
Drawing upon overseas experiences, notably U.S. law, China 
introduced the concept of shareholder inspection rights in broad terms when 
its first national company law was enacted in 1993 and has since continued 
to improve the regime, particularly in the 2005 company law revision.1  
Across the U.S., shareholder inspection rights are  in the statutes, albeit with 
some significant differences amongst them.  This paper will undertake a 
comprehensive examination of shareholder inspection rights in China and 
evaluate the effectiveness of the Chinese regime by comparing it with the 
law in Delaware, the preeminent corporate law jurisdiction in the U.S.2  It 
will examine not only written law, but also the law in action, namely how 
the law is applied in practice, by way of an empirical analysis of the relevant 
cases. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows:  Part II will trace the 
historical development of the shareholder inspection rights in China and 
discuss the key features of the current law.  Part III will present an empirical 
study of relevant cases on inspection rights in China.  Part IV will compare 
the Chinese law for shareholder inspection rights with that of Delaware and 
offer explanations for the similarities and differences between them.   
 
II.  The Legal Framework 
 
A.  A Brief History  
 
The Chinese regime for shareholder inspection rights can be traced back 
to the first national company law of the PRC, namely the 1993 PRC 
Company Law.3 The relevant provisions therein, however, were very brief 
and general, simply stating that the shareholders have the right to inspect 
certain materials such as the minutes of the shareholders’ meetings and the 
 
 1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) [Company 
Law] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective Jul. 1, 1994, amended 
in 1999, 2004, 2005, 2013 and 2018), 336 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 790 
(China).  The law underwent major changes in 2005, and relatively minor changes in 1999, 
2004, 2013 and 2018.  Hence it is customarily abbreviated as the 2005 Company Law. 
 2. See Robin Hui Huang & Randall S. Thomas, The Law and Practice of Shareholder 
Inspection Rights: Comparative Analysis of China and the United States, 53 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 907 (2020). 
 3. 1993 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (中华人民共和国公司法) 
[Company Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1993, effective Jul. 1, 1994), art. 32 & art. 110, Sup. People’s Ct. 
Gaz., Feb. 15, 1994, http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/111c1caddde6205b47f5cfb6bc24 
98.html?sw= (China). 
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financial reports.  According to an empirical study conducted by a research 
team of the First Intermediate Court of Shanghai Municipality in 2007 (2007 
Shanghai Study),4 there were a total of 46 inspection rights cases heard and 
two other local district courts in Shanghai during the period of 2002 to 2006.  
One main dispute related to the scope of materials that can be inspected, in 
particular, whether the term ‘financial reports’ covers accounting books.  
Further, in some cases, the company rejected the shareholder inspection 
request on the grounds that the request was not for a proper purpose, even 
though the 1993 PRC Company Law does not mention the ‘proper purpose’ 
requirement at all.  
The 1993 Company Law underwent several minor amendments before 
it was overhauled in 2005 and was thus called the 2005 PRC Company Law, 
which is still in force today despite some minor revisions thereafter.  The 
2005 PRC Company Law represents a significant improvement on its 1993 
predecessor, providing more details on the regime of shareholder inspection 
rights.  However, over the years, the provisions concerning shareholder 
inspection rights under the 2005 PRC Company Law proved to be 
inadequate.  On 25 August 2017, the Supreme People’s Court (SPC) 
promulgated the long-awaited fourth judicial interpretation on the 2005 
Company Law (2017 Judicial Interpretation), which came into effect on 1 
September 2017.5  It is focused on various types of company litigation 
concerning shareholder rights, including inspection rights litigation.  A total 
of six provisions are devoted to inspection rights litigation, providing more 





 4. See Li Sheng (李盛), Wu Xiaofeng (吴晓锋), Gudong Zhiqingquan, “Zhiqing” 
Zhiyu Hechu?—laizi Shanghaishi Yizhongyuan Gudong Zhiqingquan Anjian de 
Diaoyan(Zutu) (股东知情权, “知情”止于何处?—来自上海市一中院股东知情权案件的
调研(组图)) [Shareholder Inspection Rights and Its Limits: A Research on Relevant Cases by 
Shanghai Municipality 1st Intermediate Court (Group Pictures)], Sohu Xinwen (搜狐新闻) 
[Sohu News] (Oct. 21, 2007, 11:27 AM), http://news.sohu.com/20071021/n252765043. 
shtml.  
 5. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong <Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi 
Fa> Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (Si), Fashi [2017] Shiliu Hao (最高人民法院关于适用《中
华人民共和国公司法》的解释 (四), 法释【2017】16号) [2017 Judicial Interpretation] 
[The Fourth Judicial Interpretation on Various Issues Concerning the Application of 
<Company Law of the People’s Republic of China>, Judicial Interpretation No. 16 [2017]] 
(promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 25, 2017, effective Sep. 1, 2017) 
Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz., Oct. 10, 2017, http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/2b7af70914 
2a3eb2e8034d0f2b877a.html?sw= (China).  In China, the judicial interpretation as issued by 
the SPC carries the force of law. 
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B.  Key Features of the Law 
 
The key features of the shareholder inspection rights under Chinese law 
can be summarized below.  First, shareholder inspection rights are regulated 
differently according to the type of company.  There are two main types of 
companies allowed under the Chinese company law, namely the limited 
liability companies (LLC) and the joint-stock limited companies (JSC).  
From a comparative law perspective, the Chinese LLC is broadly similar to 
the close corporation in the U.S.  or the private company in British 
Commonwealth jurisdictions, while the JSC corresponds to the publicly held 
corporation or the public company in the Anglo-American world.6   
Under §33 of the 2005 PRC Company Law, shareholder inspection 
rights are stipulated in the context of LLCs as follows:  
 
Every shareholder shall be entitled to review and duplicate the 
company’s bylaws, the minutes of the shareholders’ meetings, the 
resolutions of the board of directors’ meetings, the resolutions of the 
board of supervisors’ meetings, as well as the financial reports. 
Every shareholder may request to review the accounting books 
of the company.  Where a shareholder requests to review the 
accounting books of the company, it shall submit a written request, 
which shall state his motives.  If the company, has the legitimate 
reason to believe that the shareholder’s requests to review the 
accounting books has an improper motive and may impair the 
legitimate interests of the company, it may reject the request of the 
shareholder to review the books and shall, within in 15 days after 
the shareholder submits a written request, give the shareholder a 
written reply, which shall include an explanation.  If the company 
reject the request of any shareholder to review the accounting books, 
the shareholder may plead a people’s court to demand the company 
to open the books for his review. 
 
Further, §97 of the 2005 PRC Company Law provides for inspections 
rights for shareholders of JSCs, stating that:  
 
 
 6. In the US, there is also a business form called ‘limited liability companies’, which is 
a hybrid of the US-style corporation and the partnership, and thus is different from the type 
of limited liability companies in China.  In the US, the terms ‘corporation’ and ‘company’ 
have different meanings.  Internationally, the term ‘corporation’ in the US is the counterpart 
of the term ‘company’ commonly used in many British Commonwealth jurisdictions as well 
as in China.  For convenience, the two terms are used interchangeably in this paper, unless 
specifically indicated.  
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The shareholders shall be entitled to review the bylaws, the register 
of the shareholders, the stubs of corporate bonds, the minutes of the 
shareholders’ assembly meetings, the minutes of the meetings of the 
board of directors, the minutes of the meetings of the board of 
supervisors, and the financial reports, and may put forward 
proposals or raise questions about the business operations of the 
company. 
 
Second, there are no statutory restrictions on the eligibility of the 
shareholder to exercise inspection rights, such as the requirements of 
shareholding level and period.  According to the 2017 Judicial Interpretation, 
if a shareholder of a company files for inspection rights under §33 or §97 of 
the 2005 PRC Company Law, the court should accept the case.  But if the 
company produces evidence that the plaintiff does not have the status of 
shareholder at the time of pleading, the court should dismiss the case.  There 
is an exception, however, under which if a former shareholder can produce 
prima facie evidence that their interests were harmed at the time when they 
held shares, they also have the right to inspect relevant materials falling 
within their shareholding period.7  
Third, the materials subject to inspection rights are divided into 
different categories.  The first category consists of the company’s bylaws, 
the minutes of the shareholders’ meetings, the resolutions of the board of 
directors’ meetings, the resolutions of the board of supervisors’ meetings, as 
well as the financial reports.  The second category is the accounting books 
of the company.  In the context of LLCs, the shareholder can request for both 
categories of materials.  By contrast, only the first category of materials is 
explicitly provided for the shareholders of JSCs.  Presumably, as many JSCs 
are listed companies and are required to publicly disclose accounting 
information, there is usually little need to resort to inspection rights litigation 
to get them.  Further, compared to the first category of materials available to 
LLC shareholders, there are two additional items listed for JSC shareholders, 
namely stock ledger and the stubs of corporate bonds.  It is generally 
unnecessary to include them in the context of LLCs where the number of 
shareholders is normally small, and shareholders tend to know each other 
well.  In any event, the shareholder register of LLCs can be readily available 
from the company registrar, and there is little need for inspection rights 
litigation.  Ambiguity may arise here as to whether the term ‘accounting 
books’ include original accounting vouchers and whether the inspection right 
can extend to other materials not listed in the law such as contracts.  For the 
 
 7. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, §7.  
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purpose of this paper, original accounting vouchers and other materials are 
treated as the third and fourth categories of materials respectively.   
Fourth, a bifurcated approach sets out the prerequisites for exercising 
inspections rights, depending on what category of materials the shareholder 
is trying to access.  Basically, for the first category of materials, access is 
more liberal without any explicit prerequisites laid down in the law.  In 
contrast, as the second category of materials is more sensitive, there are both 
procedural and substantive restrictions.  To start with, the shareholder needs 
to submit a written request for this type of information, which shall state his 
purpose.  Then, if the company has legitimate reasons to believe that the 
shareholder’s request for inspecting the accounting books is for improper 
purposes and may impair the legitimate interests of the company, it may 
reject the request of the shareholder to inspect the books and shall, within 15 
days after the shareholder submits a written request, give the shareholder a 
written reply to explain the rejection.  Finally, after the company refuses the 
shareholder’s request, the shareholder may apply to the appropriate court for 
an order compelling production.  If the court supports the shareholder’s 
request, the judgment should clearly specify what materials the shareholder 
can inspect as well as when and where to inspect those materials.8  
The difficult and perennial question here is what constitutes “improper 
purpose” on the part of the requisitioned shareholder.  The 2017 Judicial 
Interpretation sheds some light on this issue, enumerating four circumstances 
where improper purpose may be found:   
 
1) The shareholder is engaged in any business in substantial 
competition with the main business of the company for the 
shareholder’s own account or on behalf of any other person, 
except as otherwise specified by the company’s bylaws or 
agreed upon by all shareholders. 
 
2) The shareholder’s consultation of the company’s accounting 
books for the information of any other person may damage 
the company’s lawful interests. 
 
3) During the three years before the day when the shareholder 
files a request with the company for consultation of 
accounting books, the shareholder once consulted the 
company’s accounting books for the information of any 
other person, causing damage to the company’s lawful 
interests. 
 
 8. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, §10.  
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4) Any other circumstances showing that the shareholder has 
an illicit purpose. 
 
As can be seen above, the first three circumstances are specific, but the 
fourth limb is a catch-all provision.   
Finally, there are other rules designed to strike a balance between 
protecting legitimate use of and preventing abuse of shareholder inspection 
rights.  On the one hand, a shareholder of a company cannot be substantially 
deprived of their inspection rights by the company’s bylaws or any 
agreement between shareholders.9  Further, if a director or a senior executive 
of a company fails to perform duties in making or preserving the company’s 
documents and materials covered within the shareholder inspection rights, 
and causes harm to a shareholder, they can be held personally liable to 
compensate the shareholder.10  On the other hand, if a shareholder of a 
company divulges any trade secret of the company after exercising his or her 
inspection right, causing damage to the company’s lawful interests, then the 
shareholder can be held liable to compensate for the relevant losses suffered 
by the company.11 
As shown above, China has gradually set up a relatively complete legal 
framework for shareholder inspection rights.  However, there are still many 
unanswered questions.  For instance, can the inspection rights be exercised 
by the beneficial owner whose shares are held in a voting trust or by a 
nominee on their behalf?  What materials can be inspected?  What is the 
content of the “improper purpose” restriction?  What is meant by substantial 
deprivation of the inspection right?  Hence, it is interesting to examine how 
the shareholder inspection right has been exercised in China.  To this end, an 
empirical study will be undertaken by looking at relevant cases, and the 
above questions will be answered in light of the empirical findings.   
 
III.  Empirical Inquiry 
 
A.  Research Design and Methodology 
 
This empirical study endeavors to provide insights into the way in 
which China’s inspection rights regime has been applied in practice.  To this 
end, we try to collect relevant cases across the country from 1 January 2012 
to 31 August 2017.  There are two main reasons for the selection of this 
research period.  On the one hand, as noted earlier, a research team of the 
 
 9. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, §9. 
 10. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, §12. 
 11. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, §11.  
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First Intermediate Court of Shanghai Municipality empirically examined the 
inspection rights cases adjudicated by three Shanghai courts between 2002 
and 2006 under the 1993 Company Law.  In addition, there is another 
important empirical study published in 2013, examining a sample of 
inspection rights cases adjudicated under the 2005 Company Law across 
China from 2006 to 2011 (the 2013 Study).12 On the other hand, the 2017 
Judicial Interpretation became effective on 1 September 2017, hence it 
would be appropriate to treat cases before and after this point of time 
separately.  As the 2017 Judicial Interpretation has been in effect for a little 
over one year, more time is needed to generate sufficient data necessary for 
a proper empirical examination of its effect.   
Research was conducted using an authoritative and widely used 
electronic database of Chinese law,13 with search terms based on the relevant 
legislative provisions.  To avoid the problem that may be caused by different 
search methods, we searched for all inspection right cases during the entire 
12-year period of 2006 through 2017 (full year), rather than relying on the 
case numbers from 2006 to 2011 as produced by the 2013 Study.   
It should be acknowledged, that as with any empirical study of court 
cases, my dataset is inevitably subject to the issue of selection bias.  In other 
words, the cases in my dataset may not be a representative sample for some 
reasons.  First, many disputes may have been resolved without litigation.  
This is particularly so in China due to its general litigation-averse culture.  
Second, some cases may have been simply rejected by the court and thus did 
not proceed to trial.  Third, some court cases may never be publicly reported.  
Finally, although the electronic database used for this research is the best 
available one, it is both incomplete (the updating of the database is quite 
slow) and inaccurate (as noted above, there are issues of duplication and 
misplacement of cases).  In response to the above issues, interviews have 
also been conducted, whenever possible, to provide further information on 
the subject matter under study.   
 
B.  General Statistics 
 
1.  Number and Distribution of Cases   
 
As illustrated in Table 1, the number of cases has increased steadily and 
significantly over the years.  A total of 7545 cases were located from the six-
 
 12. See Li Jianwei (李建伟), Gudong Zhiqingquan Susong Yanjiu (股东知情权诉讼研
究) [Research on Shareholder Inspection Rights Litigation], Zhongguo Faxue (中国法学) 
[China Legal Science], no. 2, 2013, at 83. 
 13. Bei Da Fa Bao (北大法宝), http://Chinalawinfo.com (last visited June. 18, 2020). 
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year period of 2012 to 2017 (full year), which is nearly ten times that during 
the six-year period of 2006 to 2011 (781 cases).  Geographically, Jiangsu 
Province had the most cases (1048), followed by Shanghai (895), 
Guangdong province (634), Zhejiang province (548) and Beijing (518), all 
of which are economically more developed regions in China.  
 
Table 1: Temporal Distribution of Total Cases from 2006 to 2017 
(full year) 
 
Year  Number of cases  Percentage  
2017  2440 29.31% 
2016 2109 25.33% 
2015 1347 16.18% 
2014 990 11.89% 
2013 395 4.74% 
2012 264 3.17% 
2011 225 2.70% 
2010 206 2.47% 
2009 194 2.33% 
2008 107 1.29% 
2007 25 0.30% 
2006 24 0.29% 
Total  8326 100%  
 
It should be noted that in Table 1, the number of cases in 2017 means 
the cases in the whole year of 2017, because the purpose of Table 1 is to 
compare the number of cases yearly.  As noted earlier, however, the study 
period of our research ends on 31 August 2017, so the year of 2017 
mentioned in the empirical data below means the period from January 2017 
to August 2017, unless otherwise indicated.  The 2013 Study randomly 
selected a sample of 192 cases for actual analysis due to ‘the large number 
of cases’ from 2006 to 2011.14  Clearly, the total number of cases from 2012 
to 2017 is much larger.  Hence, as shown in Table 2, we also conducted a 
random sampling exercise to get a similar-sized sample of 193 cases.  This 





 14. See Li, Supra note 12, at 83, 84. 
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Table 2: Temporal Distribution of Sampled Cases and 
















2017 40 1 0 0 0 0 1 
2016 52 8 0 0 1 5 2 
2015 47 11 0 0 3 3 5 
2014 37 3 0 0 1 2 0 
2013 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 
2012 8 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Total 193 24 0 0 6 10 8 
 
Table 2 presents the information on ‘subsequent cases,’ namely the 
cases filed by the same plaintiffs against the same defendants after the 
inspection right cases.  The purpose here is to find out whether the inspection 
right cases in China were filed by the plaintiffs as a tool to investigate the 
company and collect relevant evidence to bring subsequent cases.   
As Table 2 shows, during the study period, the subsequent suit rate 
varied from year to year and overall, there were 24 subsequent suits 
concerning the 193 sampled cases, with the subsequent suit rate being 12.4%.  
This rate is lower than that found in the U.S. study where 97 subsequent suits 
arose from 542 inspection right cases, representing a subsequent suit rate of 
17.9%.15   
Further, we group subsequent suits into four categories, namely 
derivative suits, appraisal suits, liquidation suits and other suits which are 
mainly related to disputes over validity of shareholders’ resolutions, 
distribution of dividend and capital contribution by shareholders.  While 
derivative suits and class actions accounted for almost half and one-fifth of 
all subsequent suits respectively in the U.S.,16 they were not found in China.  
In China, there were up to 10 liquidation suits and 6 appraisal suits, 
representing 41.7% and 25% of all subsequent suits respectively.  
 
2.  The Hearing Court and Time-length  
 
Table 3 shows the distribution of cases according to whether the case 
was finalized at first instance or on appeal.  In China, two trials usually 
conclude a case with the second trial judgment being final, but a third trial 
 
 15. See James D. Cox, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The Paradox of 
Delaware’s ‘Tools at Hand’ Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation, 75 BUS. LAW. 2123 
(2020). 
 16. See Id. 
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(zai shen) is possible in exceptional circumstances where there are errors in 
the finding of facts or the application of the law.17 If a case goes through 
more than one trial, it will be counted only once, because it is still the same 
dispute.  From the table, it can be seen that 85 out of 193 cases appealed, 
including 5 cases undergoing the unusual third trial, which represents an 
appeal rate of 44.1%.  According to research conducted by the Judgment 
Management Office of the Supreme People’s Court, the overall appeal rate 
for all cases in 2017 across China is only 10.59%, and the appeal rate for 
civil and commercial cases is lower than that for criminal cases.18  Clearly, 
the appeal rate for inspection right cases is very high, as compared to the 
overall appeal rate for corporate law cases.   
According to Li’s study, the appeal rate for the period of 2006 to 2011 
was 49.5%19, which is even higher than that in the more recent years.  This 
indicates that the shareholders’ inspection right case has long been a very 
complicated and controversial issue for the courts to handle.  
 
Table 3: Was the case concluded at first instance or on appeal? 
 
Court Number of cases Percentage 
First trial 108 55.9% 
Second trial 80 41.5% 
Third trial 5 2.6% 
Total 193 100% 
 
Table 4 provides information on the number of days between the date 
of the initial court filing and the date of the final outcome in the case.  We 
find that during the whole period of 2012 to 2017, the mean delay is around 
101.46 days (around 3.38 months), while the median delay is roughly 81 
days (2.7 months).  In China, a civil case should normally be closed within 
six months of its filing date; a six-month extension is available in special 
circumstances, and upon the approval of the president of the court; further 
extension is possible with the approval of the next higher court.20 The mean 
 
 17. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susongfa (中华人民共和国民事诉讼法) 
[Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 9, 1991, effective Apr. 9, 1991, amended in 2007, 2012 and 2017), ch. 16, 328 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 508, 526-528 (China). The third trial is also called 
adjudication monitoring procedure. 
 18. Judgment Management Office of the Supreme People’s Court, Renmin Fayuan 
Shenpan Zhixiao Shuju Fenxi [Data Analysis of the Adjudication Efficiency of People’s 
Courts] (May 2018).  
 19. See Li, supra note 12, at 87. 
 20. Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China art. 149. 
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and median of the number of days taken to close an inspection case in China 
are both 6 months, suggesting the Chinese court tended to adjudicate cases 
quite quickly.  By contrast, the mean and median figures in the U.S. are 331.8 
and 212 respectively, both significantly higher than those in China.   
We also conducted a longitudinal study to determine whether there is 
any change in the time length of the case over the years.  Excluding 2012 
and 2017, the mean and median of the number of days taken to close an 
inspection case are quite stable. 
 
Table 4: Number of days between court filing and final outcome 
 
Year Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Median Maximum 
2017 135.708 106.41 14 111.5 408 
2016 70.933 40.259 13 72 175 
2015 103.04 70.639 18 82 248 
2014 94.913 56.991 25 69 354 
2013 112.833 71.899 25 114.5 195 
2012 91.333 42.730 51 86 170 
Total 101.46 77.091 13 81 408 
 
C.  Key Features of the Cases 
 
1.  The Features of the Plaintiff Shareholders  
 
Table 5 looks at the identity of the plaintiff shareholder, that is, whether 
the case was brought by a natural or legal person.  Compared to individual 
shareholders, corporate shareholders usually have more resources and 
leverage to obtain information from the company, and thus less need to bring 
suit to inspect corporate documents.21  This hypothesis seems to be borne out 
of our research finding that 85.5% of cases were brought by individuals and 
only 14.5% of cases were initiated by legal persons.  Li’s study also 
supported this hypothesis by showing that only 18% of sampled cases were 






 21. For cases that there were both natural person and legal person plaintiffs, the cases 
fall into the category of legal person plaintiffs.  
 22. See, Li, supra note 12, at 84. 
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Table 5: Was the plaintiff a natural or legal person?  
 
Identity Number Percentage 
Individual 165 85.5% 
Legal Person 28 14.5% 
Total 193 100% 
 
Under the 2005 Company law, the shareholders have certain 
governance powers depending on their shareholding levels.  To begin, the 
shareholders separately or aggregately holding 3% or more of the shares of 
the company have the power to put forward an interim proposal to the 
shareholders’ assembly for discussion.23  Second, the shareholders separately 
or aggregately holding 10% or more of the shares of the company can ask 
for an interim shareholders’ assembly session to be held.24  Further, the 
shareholders who hold 10% or more of the voting rights are empowered to 
plead the people’s court to dissolve the company, when the company meets 
serious difficulty in its operation so that the interests of the shareholders will 
face heavy loss if the company continues to exist and the difficulty cannot 
be solved by any other means.25  Third, under Chinese law, the shareholders 
separately or aggregately holding 30% or more of shares are considered to 
have actual control of the company.26  
As shown in Table 6, for a total of 68.72% of plaintiffs, the 
shareholding level is less than 50%, and the plaintiffs with a shareholding 
level between 10% and 30% filed most of the inspection cases.  This 
empirical finding is consistent with Li’s finding27 and supports the theory 
that the inspection right suits provide an important remedy mainly for 
minority shareholders.  However, up to 10 cases, or 5.13% of all cases, were 
brought by shareholders who held more than 50% of shares in the company.  
This is surprising because those shareholders presumably had control over 
their companies and there should be no need for them to resort to inspection 
right suits to get relevant information.   
 
 23. Company Law art. 102, para. 2 (China). 
 24. Company Law art. 100, para. 3 (China). 
 25. Company Law art. 182 (China). 
 26. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengquan Fa (中华人民共和国证券法) [Securities 
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 1998, 
effective Jul. 1, 1999, amended in 2004, 2005, 2013, 2014 and 2019), art. 88, 343 Standing 
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. 1, 12 (China). 
 27. See, Li, supra note 12, at 85.  (According to Li’s study, 41.67% of plaintiffs’ 
shareholding level was less than 10%, 22.22% of plaintiffs’ shareholding level was between 
11% and 30%, and 31.94% of plaintiffs’ shareholding level was between 31% and 50%. A 
total of 95.83% of plaintiffs’ shareholding level was under 50%). 
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Upon closer examination, these cases share a common feature that 
ownership and management of the company are relatively separated.  
Namely, the minority shareholder is the legal representative and executive 
director of the company, while the majority shareholder acts as supervisor or 
even has no management position.28  When a majority-minority shareholder 
conflict arises, the majority may not easily solve the issue through the 
exercise of its voting power.  For one thing, the position of legal 
representative has important power to represent the company to sign 
contracts and bring suits, and can only be removed by a special resolution of 
the shareholders’ meeting which requires approval by two-thirds or more of 
the voting rights.29  In most of the cases, the majority shareholder held more 
than half but less than two-thirds of voting powers.  Further, directors usually 
serve a term of three years and cannot be removed without cause.30  Finally, 
in practice, even if the majority shareholder may succeed in exercising its 
voting power to change legal representative or executive director, the former 
legal representative or executive director (the minority shareholder) may 
refuse to hand over company seals and documents.  Hence, the majority 
shareholder may have to bring inspection right suits to obtain relevant 





 28. See, e.g., Liu Ye Su Shanghai Xinxin Gongmao Youxiangongsi 
Gudongzhiqingquanjiufen An (刘晔诉上海信鑫工贸有限公司股东知情权纠纷案) [Liu Ye 
vs Shanghai Xinxin Gongmao Co.], https://www.pkulaw.com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07f35b 
6e5434f630722e7b812ee18babb321bdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC%882014%EF%BC%89
%E9%9D%92%E6%B0%91%E4%BA%8C%EF%BC%88%E5%95%86%EF%BC%89%E
5%88%9D%E5%AD%97%E7%AC%AC163%E5%8F%B7 (Shanghai Municipality  
Qingpu District Court Apr. 16, 2014) (China); Chen Fuquan Su Tianjin Minchuang 
Jiancaishichangguanli Youxiangongsi Gudongzhiqingquanjiufen An (陈伏谦诉天津闽创建
材市场管理有限公司股东知情权纠纷案) [Chen Fuqian vs Tianjin Minchuang Jiancai 
Shichang Co.], https://www.pkulaw.com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07f338a98b4131ed3c2b77ec9c 
541ff6afc5bdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC%882014%EF%BC%89%E8%BE%B0%E6%B0
%91%E5%88%9D%E5%AD%97%E7%AC%AC3128%E5%8F%B7 (Tianjin Municipality 
Beicheng District Court Oct. 22, 2014) (China); Zhongshang Zichan Pinggu Youxianzeren 
Gongsi Jilin Fengongsi Yu Luo Donghao Gudongzhiqingquanjiufen Shangsu An (中商资产
评估有限责任公司吉林分公司与罗东皓股东知情权纠纷上诉案) [Zhongshang Zichan 
Pinggu Co vs Luo Donghao (Appeal), https://www.pkulaw.com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07 
f31897ed3ca8cda753017ca5c50af4edbcbdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC%882015%EF%BC
%89%E9%95%BF%E6%B0%91%E5%9B%9B%E7%BB%88%E5%AD%97%E7%AC%A
C175%E5%8F%B7, (Jilin Province Changchun City Intermediate Court May 20, 2015) 
(China). 
 29. Company Law art. 43 (China). 
 30. Company Law art. 45 (China). 
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Table 6: What was the plaintiff’s shareholding?   
 
Shareholding Level  Number Percentage 
Less than 3%  16 8.21% 
More than 3% and Less than 10% 18 9.23% 
More than 10% and less than 30%  58 29.74% 
More than 30% and less than 50% 42 21.38% 
More than 50% 10 5.13% 
Not clear  51 26.15% 
Total 193 100% 
 
Table 7 further examines whether the plaintiff held any office in the 
company.  There is a total of 199 plaintiffs, which is more than the number 
of cases because some cases have more than one plaintiff.  Not surprisingly, 
the majority (84.92%) of shareholders hold no position in the company.  For 
the plaintiff shareholders holding a position in the defendant company, most 
of them held the position of supervisor.  This reflects the reality that due to 
the lack of real powers, particularly the power to appoint and remove 
directors as is the case in the German system, the supervisors in China can 
barely perform its statutory role in monitoring the management board.31  
 
Table 7: Was the plaintiff in the management?  
 
Role in the Company Number Percentage  
Director 9 4.52% 
Non-director manager  1 0.50% 
Supervisor 13 6.53% 
Other officer 7 3.52% 
No position  169 84.92% 
Total  199 100% 
 
2.  The Features of the Defendant Company  
 
Table 8 presents the information on the types of defendant companies 
involved in the sample cases.  The vast majority of defendant companies are 
 
 31. Company Law art. 53 (China). See also Wang  Shiquan (王世权), Jianshihui de 
Benyuan Xingzhi, Zuoyong Jili yu Zhongguo Shangshigongsi Zhili Chuangxin (监事会的本
源性质、作用机理与中国上市公司治理创新) [The Nature and Mechanism of the 
Supervisory Board and the Innovation of Corporate Governance of Listed Companies in 
China], Guanli Pinglun (管理评论) [Management Review], no. 4, 2011, at 51 (finding that 
“the supervisory board is not effective in practice”). 
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LLCs, while only 4 defendant companies are JSCs.32  In addition, there are 
a small number of other types of business entities such as joint ventures and 
even private schools.33  Several plausible reasons may be offered to explain 
the little use of inspection right suits in the context of JSCs.  On the one hand, 
the JSCs, particularly listed companies, are subject to a heightened level of 
disclosure duties under securities law, and thus there is much less need for 
their shareholders to resort to inspection right suits.  On the other hand, as 
discussed earlier, unlike the shareholders in LLCs, JSC shareholders are not 
empowered to inspect company accounting books according to the Chinese 
company law.34  Since the shareholders in JSCs cannot inspect company 
accounting books which usually contain very important information, there 
will be fewer incentives for them to take the trouble to file an inspection right 
suit.  Further, the shareholders in JSCs can inspect, but are not allowed to 
copy, the relevant company documents.  Plainly, this significantly reduces 
the usefulness of the inspection right suit. 
 
Table 8: What was the type of the defendant company?   
 
Company Type Number Percentage 
LLC 183 94.81% 
JSC 4 2.07% 
Others  6  3.12% 
Total  193 100% 
 
 
 32. Most of the JSCs concerned here were not listed on the two national stock exchanges, 
namely the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, but rather on 
regional stock exchanges such as the Tianjing Equity Exchange. See e.g., Huang Tianyi Su 
Hubei Wudang Jiuye Gufenyouxiangongsi Deng Gudongzhiqingquan Jiufen An (黄田毅诉
湖北武当酒业股份有限公司等股东知情权纠纷案) [Huang Tianyi vs Hubei Wudang 
Liquor Co.], https://www.pkulaw.com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07f3404f5f9de8c7172d740788 
fffe324449bdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC%882014%EF%BC%89%E4%B8%B9%E6%B1
%9F%E5%8F%A3%E6%B0%91%E5%88%9D%E5%AD%97%E7%AC%AC01768%E5%
8F%B7 (Hubei Province Danjiangkou City Court Mar. 24, 2015) (China). 
 33. See, e.g., Shanghai Jiahua Qiye Fazhan Youxiangongsi Su Shanghai Jiahua Jiaoyu 
Jinxiu Xueyuan Gudongzhiqingquan Jiufen An (上海佳华企业发展有限公司诉上海佳华
教育进修学院股东知情权纠纷案) [Shanghai Jiahua Enterprise Ltd vs Shanghai Jiahua 
Continuing Education School], http://gongbao.court.gov.cn/Details/b55ce4524093c9d 
bcb3949a1a5d4ea.html, 2019 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 2 (Shanghai Municipality 1st 
Intermediate Court 2016) (China) (holding that although private schools do not take the 
company form in China, their organizers can bring inspection right suits in a way by analogy 
with the company law). 
 34. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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Table 9 conducts an investigation into whether the defendant was a 
state-owned enterprise (SOE).35 It is shown that SOEs were found to be the 
defendant in inspection right suits, but the number is quite low.  One possible 
reason is that it can be harder to file the case in the court, because the purpose 
of the case is to gain access to non-public information of SOEs which can be 
too politically sensitive.   
 
Table 9: Was the defendant company a state-owned enterprise (SOE)? 
 
SOE Number  Percentage  
Yes 9 4.66% 
No 183 94.82% 
Unclear  1 0.52% 
Total  193 100% 
 
As Table 10 illustrates, up to 123 defendant companies, or about two-
thirds of all defendant companies, had less than RMB 10 million in registered 
capital.  According to the tax law in China, this group of companies is 
generally considered to be the so-called Micro and Small-sized enterprises 
(Xiao Wei Qi Ye).36  There were even 42 defendant companies with 
registered capital which is less than RMB 1 million.  Hence, inspection right 
suits are mostly used in the context of small companies which generally have 
weaker corporate governance.   
 
Table: 10 What was the size of defendant company?  
 
Registered capital  Number  Percentage  
Below 1 m  42 21.76% 
1m to 10 (含10m) 81 41.97% 
10m-100m(含100m) 60 31.09% 
Above 100m  7 3.63% 
Not clear 3 1.55% 
 
 35. As many judgments do not contain complete information on the ownership of the 
defendant company, we used an authoritative database called Tian Yan Cha to check the 
shareholding structure of the defendant company.  Tian Yan Cha (天眼查), www.tiany 
ancha.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2020). 
 36. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suodeshui Fa Shishi Tiaoli (中华人民共和国
企业所得税法实施条例) [Regulations for the Implementation of the Law of the People’s 
Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax] (promulgated by the St. Council, Dec. 6, 2007, 
effective Jan. 1, 2008; rev’d by the St. Council, Apr. 23, 2019), art. 92, St. Council Gaz., Dec., 
2019, at 450 http://www.gov.cn/gbgl/e1fd6935b5cf4f3da4aca7a1125d23e3/files/f86adf87fc 
684030980c26d8e0c8f773.pdf (China). 
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Total  193 100% 
 
3.  The Types of Materials Requested for Inspection  
 
Table 11 examines what information the plaintiffs asked for in the suits 
and whether their requests were supported by the court.  As discussed earlier, 
the information requested can be broadly divided into four categories.  In 
practice, the plaintiffs usually request more than one category of information 
in a case, which explains why the total number of entries in Table 11 is 
significantly higher than the number of inspection right suits.  In adjudicating 
the case, the court will look at the multiple requests separately and make 
decisions accordingly.  Hence, we calculate the rate of support on the basis 
of the category of information requested.   
 
Table: 11 What were the materials requested for inspection?  
 
Types of Materials 
requested for 
inspection  





(stockholder list etc) 
164 34.10% 141 23 85.98% 
2nd category 
(accounting books) 
172 35.76% 132 40 76.74% 
3rd category (original 
accounting vouchers) 
109 22.66% 68 41 62.39% 
4th category (contracts, 
client list etc)  
36 7.48% 5 31 13.89% 
Total  481 100% 346 135 71.93% 
 
As Table 11 shows, for the 193 sample cases, there is a total of 481 
information requests.  Within the four categories of information requested, 
the second category (accounting books) was most frequently requested 
(35.76%), closely followed by the first category (34.10%).  The fourth 
category was requested the least (7.48%).  This contrasts with the finding of 
Li’s study that the largest portion of requests (48.34%) was made for the first 
category of information.  Further, the percentage of requests for the third 
category materials (original accounting vouchers) under our study (22.66%) 
is significantly higher than the figure in Li’s study a few years ago (9.27%).  
The difference shows that there has been a clear trend towards the request 
for accounting materials, including accounting books and original 
accounting vouchers.   
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Out of the total 481 requests, 346 requests are supported by the court, 
making the average support rate 71.93%.  However, the support rate varies 
greatly amongst the different categories of information.  Not surprisingly, 
the first category has the highest support rate (85.98%), since it is clearly 
allowed under Article 33 for LLCs and Article 97 for JSCs.  The major 
reason for rejecting a request for the first category of information is that the 
plaintiffs were found not to be the shareholders of the defendants.  The 
second category of information gets the second-highest support rate 
(76.74%).  Again, Article 33 clearly allows access to the second category of 
information, but there is a procedural prerequisite, that is, the plaintiff should 
send a prior written request to the company.  In some cases, the plaintiff 
shareholder lost simply by failing to satisfy this procedural requirement.   
The support rate of the third category of information is also quite high 
(62.39%), even though it is below the average support rate.  In general, the 
courts consider original accounting vouchers to be covered under inspection 
right provisions.  The failure of the plaintiff shareholders in those 
unsupported suits is usually either due to their lack of shareholder status or 
because they did not fulfill the procedural prerequisite as noted above.  In 
contrast, the request for the fourth category of information was seldom 
supported (13.89%), as the court generally considers it to fall outside the 
scope of the inspection right provisions.   
 
4.  The “Improper Purpose” Defense  
 
Table 12 presents how the defense of improper purpose has been used 
by the defendant company in inspection right suits.  Overall, the improper 
purpose defense was raised in 59 cases, representing 30.57% of all cases.  As 
discussed earlier, the 2017 Judicial Interpretation provides guidance on the 
meaning of improper purpose by listing four types of improper purposes.37  
Amongst the first three specific types of improper purposes enumerated 
therein, the first type was most frequently raised (32.76%), while there is no 
case using the second type and only one case using the third type.  As the 
fourth type is a catch-all category of “other circumstances,” we further divide 
this type into four sub-categories which are found to be used by the defendant 
company in the sample cases.  The first sub-category was very general and 





 37. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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Table 12: What were the types of improper purposes for 
requesting accounting books?  
 
Types of claimed 
improper purposes  




The shareholder is engaged 
in any business in 
substantial competition 
with the main business of 
the company 
19 32.2% 1 18 5.26% 
The shareholder is seeking 
inspect rights to provide 
information to others  
0 0   0 
The shareholder did seek 
inspect rights to provide 
information to others 
within the past three years 
1 1.69% 0 1 0 
Other circumstances  39 66.1% 0 39 0 
The shareholder may 
damage the interest of the 
company 
29 49.15% 0 29 0 
The shareholder may affect 
the normal operation of the 
company 
4 6.78% 0 4 0 
There is improper purpose  4 6.78% 0 4 0 
The shareholder seeks to 
get information as evidence 
in another case  
2 3.39% 0 2 0 
Total  59 100% 1 58 1.69% 
 
However, the defendant company was successful in only one case, and 
there are several possible reasons behind this.  First, it is very difficult for 
the defendant company to establish improper purposes on the part of the 
plaintiff shareholder.  The only successful case is Jianghan vs Qichang 
Xingli Haimen Railway Materials Ltd, where the defendant company proved 
that the plaintiff shareholder was involved in another company which had 
the same business and the same target clients as the defendant company so 
that the first specific type of improper purposes applied.38  However, if the 
 
 38. See Jiangmou Qichang Xingli Haimen Tielu Cailiao Youxiangongsi 
Gudongzhiqingquan Jiufen An (姜某戚厂兴力海门铁路材料有限公司股东知情权纠纷案) 
[Jianghan vs Qichang Xingli Haimen Railway Materials Ltd.], https://www.pkulaw.com/ 
pfnl/a25051f3312b07f342102ff5b266ec5a216ff4fd76f6524dbdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC
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plaintiff shareholder engages in a business which is not the same as the 
defendant company, it can be difficult to convince the court that the first 
specific type of improper purposes should apply.  For instance, in the case of 
Zhang Zhenping vs.  Beijing Heshi Lianchuang Culture Promotion Ltd, the 
defendant claimed that the shareholder was engaged in a business in 
substantial competition with the main business of the company, but the court 
rejected it because evidence showed that the plaintiff shareholder’s spouse 
ran a company whose business scope only overlapped partly with the 
defendant company.39  
Further, a common feature of the four sub-categories of the defenses 
under the catch-all provision is that the defendant company just makes a 
general claim without giving concrete evidence.  This helps explain why all 
of them were not supported by the court.  Finally, before the promulgation 
of the 2017 Judicial Interpretation, it was less clear what might constitute 
improper purposes, and sometimes, the court did not even find improper 
purposes when the requesting shareholder is engaged in a business in 
substantial competition with the main business of the company.  For 
instance, in the case of Yang Jianbing and Ma Haoran at al vs Jiangsu 
Province HuaiAn City Guoyuan Taxation Firm,40 the plaintiff shareholders 
left the company and joined another company in the same business.  The 
court held that the non-competition rule applied to directors and not 
shareholders under Chinese law and that there was no evidence to suggest 
improper purposes on the part of the plaintiff shareholders.  Had the case 
occurred after the 2017 Judicial Interpretation, the mere fact of the plaintiff 





(Jiangsu Province Haimen City Court June 24, 2016) (China). 
 39. See Zhang Zhenping Su Beijing Heishi Lianchuang Wenhua Chuanbo 
Youxiangongsi Gudongzhiqingquan Jiufen An (张振平诉北京黑石联创文化传播有限公司
股东知情权纠纷案) [Zhang Zhenping vs Beijing Heishi Lianchuang Culture Promotion 
Ltd.], https://www.pkulaw.com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07f38ff0ec1ad54a4c1a0ced9e756ee6be 
60bdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC%882017%EF%BC%89%E4%BA%AC0114%E6%B0%9
1%E5%88%9D12911%E5%8F%B7 (Beijing Municipality Changping District Court Aug. 
30, 2017) (China). 
 40. See Yang Jianbing, Ma Haoran deng yu Jiangsusheng Huaianshi Guoyuan Shuiwu 
Lüshi Shiwusuo Youxiangongsi Gudongzhiqingquan Jiufen An (杨建兵、马浩然等与江苏
省淮安市国源税务师事务所有限公司股东知情权纠纷案) [Yang Jianbing and Ma Haoran 
at al vs Jiangsu Province HuaiAn City Guoyuan Taxation Firm], https://www.pkulaw. 
com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07f34f28c823d76d37b85625c3c2f38d4742bdfb.html?keyword=%E
F%BC%882015%EF%BC%89%E6%B5%A6%E5%95%86%E5%88%9D%E5%AD%97%
E7%AC%AC00513%E5%8F%B7 (Jiangsu Province HuaiAn City Qingpu District Court 
Aug. 13, 2015) (China). 
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5.  Substantial Deprivation of the Inspection Rights  
 
As discussed earlier, it is stipulated in China that a shareholder of a 
company cannot be substantially deprived of their inspection rights by the 
company’s bylaws or any agreement between shareholders, and thus Table 
13 is intended to provide information on whether and how the ‘substantial 
deprivation’ rule has been applied.  Out of the total 193 sample cases, the 
substantial deprivation issue was raised in only 3 cases, showing that it is not 
common to restrict the shareholders’ inspection right through the bylaws or 
the shareholders’ agreement in China.  Further, out of the three cases, only 
one case was found to constitute substantial deprivation.  Finally, the 
restrictions in dispute are mainly based on the confidentiality issue, and thus 
are functionally similar to the defense of improper purposes which also 
includes leaking information to others. 
 
Table 13: Frequency distribution of circumstances of substantial 
deprivation  
 
Forms of disputed 
substantial deprivation  
Number 
of cases  




Company constitution  1 33.33% 1 0 
Shareholder resolution  2 66.67% 1 1 
Total  3 100% 2 1 
 
In the first case of Wujing vs Nanjing Xinliansheng Ltd,41 the company’s 
bylaws required that the shareholder should make a written request and a 
confidentiality commitment before exercising the inspection right.  Under 
the bylaws, the company could also refuse the inspection request of the 
shareholder who has leaked the company’s secrets before.  The court held 
that the restrictions in the bylaws were reasonable and did not constitute 
substantive deprivation.  Similarly, in the second case of Yang Jianbing and 
Ma Haoran at al vs Jiangsu Province HuaiAn City Guoyuan Taxation 
Firm,42 the company’s bylaws stipulated that the company can disallow a 
 
 41. See Wujing Su Nanjing Xinliansheng Shiye Youxiangongsi Gudongzhiqingquan 
Jiufen An (吴静诉南京新联盛实业有限公司股东知情权纠纷案) [Wujing vs Nanjing 
Xinliansheng Ltd.], https://www.pkulaw.com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07f30c47f8a842e4a937a4 
c0830226eb825fbdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC%882013%EF%BC%89%E6%A0%96%E5
%95%86%E5%88%9D%E5%AD%97%E7%AC%AC286%E5%8F%B7 (Jiangsu Province 
Nanjing City Qixia District Court Dec. 5, 2013) (China). 
 42. See Yang Jianbing, Ma Haoran deng yu Jiangsusheng Huaianshi Guoyuan Shuiwu 
Lüshi Shiwusuo Youxiangongsi Gudongzhiqingquan Jiufen An (杨建兵、马浩然等与江苏
省淮安市国源税务师事务所有限公司股东知情权纠纷案) [Yang Jianbing and Ma Haoran 
1 - Huang HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2020  8:41 AM 
26 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 44:1 
shareholder to exercise the inspection rights for the purpose of protecting its 
business secrets.  The court did not hold this to be invalid but nevertheless 
ordered the defendant company to provide the documents requested because 
it failed to prove that the plaintiffs’ request for information was for improper 
purposes.   
However, in the third case of Jiang Xuyang vs Sichuan Rongyi Holding 
Ltd,43 the defendant company passed a shareholder resolution because the 
requesting shareholder was involved in another case against the company, 
he would lose his inspection rights.  The court found this shareholder 
resolution to constitute ‘substantial deprivation’, holding that ‘the 
shareholders’ inspection rights are the inherent rights of the shareholders, 
and should not be restricted through shareholder agreements or other 
means.44  
 
IV.  Analysis and Suggestions 
 
A.  Overview 
 
As shown in the empirical study above, shareholder inspection rights 
have been used with increasing frequency in China over the years, exhibiting 
many interesting features.  Compared to the relevant empirical findings in 
the U.S. (as represented by Delaware), there are similarities and 
differences.45  
On the one hand, shareholder inspection rights are introduced and 
applied in both jurisdictions as an important corporate governance measure.  
This similarity may warrant a further explanation, given that the two 
jurisdictions actually face quite different corporate governance issues.  
Indeed, as is well-recognized in comparative corporate law scholarship, 
 
at al vs Jiangsu Province HuaiAn City Guoyuan Taxation Firm], https://www.pkulaw.com/ 
pfnl/a25051f3312b07f34f28c823d76d37b85625c3c2f38d4742bdfb.html?keyword=%EF%B
C%882015%EF%BC%89%E6%B5%A6%E5%95%86%E5%88%9D%E5%AD%97%E7%
AC%AC00513%E5%8F%B7 (Jiangsu Province HuaiAn City Qingpu District Court Aug. 13, 
2015) (China). 
 43. See Jiang Xuyang Su Sichuan Rongyi Konggu Youxiangongsi Gudongzhiqingquan 
Jiufen An (蒋旭阳诉四川融易控股有限公司股东知情权纠纷案) [Jiang Xuyang vs 
Sichuan Rongyi Holding Ltd.], https://www.pkulaw.com/pfnl/a25051f3312b07f3fddd 
c2cf29e85297ae1b478ca9d085c4bdfb.html?keyword=%EF%BC%882017%EF%BC%89%
E5%B7%9D0191%E6%B0%91%E5%88%9D4142%E5%8F%B7 (Sichuan Province Chengdu 
City High-Tech Development District Court Aug. 16, 2017) (China). 
 44. Id.   
 45. See James D. Cox, Kenneth J. Martin & Randall S. Thomas, The Paradox of 
Delaware’s ‘Tools at Hand’ Doctrine: An Empirical Investigation, 75 BUS. LAW. 2123 
(2020). 
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agency problems and thus the strategies used to deal with them differ 
systematically across jurisdictions.46  There are three main agency problems 
in the company, namely the conflict between the shareholders and the 
managers, the conflict between the majority shareholders and the minority 
shareholders, and the conflict between the shareholders and the non-
shareholder stakeholders such as creditors, employees, and customers.  In 
the U.S. where the publicly traded company is characterized by dispersed 
ownership, the shareholder-manager conflict is the main type of agency 
problem, while in China where the ownership of shares is more concentrated 
in the hands of majority shareholders, whether the state or families, the 
second agency problem is more severe.  In both contexts, however, 
shareholder inspection rights can play an important role in generating 
relevant information needed for controlling their respective agency 
problems.  Hence, despite the different types of agency problems in 
corporate governance between China and the U.S., shareholder inspection 
rights are similarly useful in mitigating informational asymmetry and 
facilitating shareholder engagement.  
On the other hand, there are noteworthy differences in the use of 
shareholder inspection rights between the two jurisdictions.  For instance, 
while inspection rights in both countries are frequently used as a pre-suit 
discovery device, significant differences can be seen in relation to the 
number and the types of subsequent litigation filed in each country.  As 
already explained elsewhere, this can be explained by the differences in the 
pattern of corporate strategies for reducing agency costs as well as in the 
corporate litigation regime between the two jurisdictions.47  To be sure, there 
can be other factors contributing to the differences in the practice of 
shareholder inspection rights, including the differences in the law itself.  
Indeed, although China introduced its legal framework for shareholder 
inspection rights by borrowing overseas experiences, notably the U.S., China 
has tried to make relevant adaptations to suit its local conditions.  
As such, it is useful to conduct a detailed comparison of the key 
elements of the shareholder inspection rights law in the two jurisdictions, 
and based on it, make improvement suggestions for China.  In some sense, 
shareholder inspection rights seem to be a double-edged sword, because, 
while it can usefully empower the shareholders by giving them access to 
relevant information to engage in corporate governance, there is a danger 
that it may be misused by some shareholders to the detriment of the 
company.  Hence, in evaluating the law on shareholder inspection rights, it 
 
 46. See REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A 
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 29-47 (3th ed. 2017). 
 47. See Huang & Thomas, supra note 2 at 907. 
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is important to strike a proper balance between facilitating the right of the 
shareholder to inspect and preventing misuse of the right to harm the 
corporation and other shareholders.  
 
B.  Facilitating Exercise of the Rights  
 
1.  What Kinds of Shareholder can Inspect?  
 
In China, inspections rights are available to any current shareholder of 
the company as well as former shareholders who can establish their interests 
were harmed during the shareholding period.  It is unclear however whether 
inspection rights can be exercised by the beneficial owner whose shares are 
held in a voting trust or by a nominee on their behalf.   
Similarly, Delaware’s statute grants inspection rights to any 
shareholder which is defined as a shareholder of record.48  Although other 
evidence may be considered, the corporation’s stock ledger is prima facie 
evidence of stock ownership.  The Delaware courts have traditionally refused 
to give beneficial owners access to corporate documents under the statute,49 
but a beneficial owner may sue for inspection rights under the common law.   
In recent years, China has seen a rise in the popularity of the so-called 
“nominal shareholding” mechanism (mingyi chigu), under which an actual 
shareholder asks another person to act as a nominal shareholder to hold 
shares for him as a beneficial owner of the shares.  The Supreme People’s 
Court has issued a judicial interpretation to formally recognize the validity 
of such a mechanism.50  In theory, as the beneficial owners are the true 
 
 48. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(a), (b) (West). 
 49. See, e.g., State ex rel. Crowder v. Sperry Corp., 15 A.2d 661 (Del. Super. 1940) 
(holding that a stockholder who had placed his stock into a voting trust was a beneficial owner 
and that the beneficial owner was not entitled to inspection rights); Lenahan v. Natl. Computer 
Analysts Corp., 310 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 1973) (holding that a beneficial owner was not 
entitled to inspection rights under s220 of Delaware General Corporation Law). 
 50. Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong <Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi 
Fa> Ruogan Wenti de Guiding (San), Fashi [2014]  Er Hao (最高人民法院关于适用《中华
人民共和国公司法》的解释 (三) , 法释【2014】2号) [The Third Judicial Interpretation on 
Various Issues Concerning the Application of <Company Law of the People’s Republic of 
China>, Judicial Interpretation No. 2 [2014]] (promulgated by the Judicial Comm. Sup. 
People’s Ct., Dec. 6, 2010, effective Feb. 16, 2011, amended in 2014), sec. 24, Sup. People’s 





%98%e7%9a%84%e8%a7%84%e5%ae%9a%ef%bc%88 (China).  It should be noted that 
this rule applies only in the context of a limited liability company, and there is a debate on 
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owners of the stock, they should be entitled to inspect corporate documents 
in order to protect their interests.  In practice, however, it can be difficult or 
costly to allow beneficial owners to exercise inspection rights, as it entails 
the task of analyzing various forms of beneficial ownership in order to 
determine who actually and ultimately receives the benefit from stock 
ownership.  In China, share ownership is usually determined by reference to 
the company’s list of shareholders.  Article 32 of the Company Law states 
that “the shareholders recorded in the registry of shareholders may, pursuant 
to the registry of shareholders, claim to and exercise the shareholder’s 
rights.”51  Hence, at least for now, it might be advisable to confine inspection 
rights to the legal owner of shares as recorded in the shareholder registry.   
Another issue here is whether the shareholder of a parent company has 
the right to inspect the relevant materials of the subsidiary company.  This 
question may be answered in the negative under a literal reading of Chinese 
law.  In contrast, Delaware law allows it, to the extent that:52  
 
a. The corporation has actual possession and control of such 
records of such subsidiary; or 
b. The corporation could obtain such records through the 
exercise of control over such subsidiary, provided that as of 
the date of the making of the demand: 
1. The stockholder inspection of such books and records 
of the subsidiary would not constitute a breach of an 
agreement between the corporation or the subsidiary 
and a person or persons not affiliated with the 
corporation; and  
2. The subsidiary would not have the right under the law 
applicable to it to deny the corporation access to such 
books and records upon demand by the corporation.   
 
This paper suggests China should consider adopting the Delaware 
experience to allow the shareholder of a parent company to inspect the 
relevant materials of the subsidiary company.  In practice, given the close 
relationship between a parent company and its subsidiary company, it is 
often important to check not only the documents of the parent company but 
also those of the subsidiary company.  Without access to relevant documents 
 
whether the “nominal shareholding” mechanism is allowed in a joint stock company. In 
practice, the China Securities Regulatory Commission, the watchdog of the Chinese securities 
markets, has often asked listing applicants to dismantle such mechanisms before they get 
listed. 
 51. Company Law art. 32, para. 2 (China). 
 52. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(b)(2) (West). 
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of the subsidiary company, the shareholder may not be able to see the 
complete picture, particularly when the parent company’s control over the 
subsidiary company is high enough to manipulate relevant transactions.   
 
2.  Can the Shareholder Inspect via Agents?  
 
In exercising inspection rights, the shareholders may need to seek 
expert assistance, due to the complexity and sheer volume of financial data 
contained in corporate documents.  Under Chinese law, an inspecting 
stockholder may conduct their inspection of the company’s documents with 
the assistance of an accountant, a lawyer, or any other practitioner of an 
intermediary.53  There are two conditions for the use of agents here.  First, 
the shareholder needs to be present.  Second, the agent has an obligation of 
confidentiality in accordance with the law or the code of practice.   
In comparison, Delaware law appears to be more flexible, allowing a 
stockholder to conduct his inspection of corporate records in person or 
through an attorney or other agent.54 At the same time, the Delaware court 
also has more freedom to restrict the stockholder’s choice of agents.  Apart 
from confidentiality reasons, there can be other restrictions on the choice of 
agents, as long as it is necessary to protect the interests of the company.  For 
instance, the court may bar the inspecting stockholder from selecting as his 
agents’ persons involved in pending litigation against the company.55  
This paper submits that Delaware law is worthy of serious consideration 
for China.  On the one hand, there does not seem to be any strong reason why 
the shareholder needs to be present when their agent actually does the 
inspection work.  As long as the agent can show proper authorization from 
the shareholder, the presence of the shareholder does not serve any useful 
purpose.  By allowing the agent to work on its own, the shareholder does not 
have to waste time, money, and energy to come to the inspection site.  On 
the other hand, it would be desirable to let the court to have more flexibility 
in imposing relevant restrictions on the choice of agents.  Confidentiality is 
certainly one of the key conditions for the choice of the agent but may not 
be the only one.  For instance, conflicts of interest should also be a key factor 
in considering whether a particular person would be appropriate to act as an 
agent.  Due to the complex and varied circumstances of each case, a one-




 53. 2017 Judicial Interpretation, sec. 10, para. 2.  
 54. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(b) (West). 
 55. See, e.g., Henshaw v. Am. Cement Corp., 252 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 1969). 
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3.  What Types of Documents can be Inspected? 
 
Chinese law is very detailed on the documents that can be inspected, 
dividing them into four different categories, including the first category such 
as stockholder list, the second category such as accounting books, the third 
category such as original accounting vouchers, and the fourth category such 
as contracts.56  A shareholder has almost absolute right to inspect the first 
category of documents, such as the company’s bylaws, the minutes of the 
shareholders’ meetings, the resolutions of the board of directors’ meetings, 
the resolutions of the board of supervisors’ meetings, as well as the financial 
reports.  In contrast, the second category of documents means accounting 
books, which is more sensitive than the first category.  Hence, the 
shareholder needs to follow certain procedural rules to make a request, and 
the company may reject the request on the grounds of “improper purpose.”  
It is not entirely clear whether inspection rights can cover other documents, 
such as original accounting vouchers, contracts and client lists.  As the 
empirical inquiry finds out, most of the requests for the third category of 
information were actually supported by the courts, while the fourth category 
of information was generally considered by the court to fall outside the scope 
of the inspection right provisions.57 
In contrast, Delaware’s statute is silent on the scope of corporate 
documents that a shareholder can inspect, let alone divide them into different 
categories with different treatments.  Unlike China, there is no list specifying 
the documents subject to inspection in Delaware’s statute.  Rather, a 
stockholder can examine any documents, as long as they are essential to his 
purpose.  It is a question of fact as to what documents are essential to a 
stockholder’s purpose, and the courts may limit the scope of the examination 
as they see fit.58  
From a practical perspective, Chinese law is clearer and more detailed, 
providing more guidance on what documents can be inspected and what 
requirements to follow in doing so.  This can facilitate shareholders 
exercising the right to obtain relevant documents, particularly the first 
category of information.  However, by enumerating specific items of 
information that can be inspected, Chinese law invites the problem of 
rigidity.  As noted above, the Chinese courts are found to generally refuse to 
extend the inspection rights to the documents not listed in the statute.  Indeed, 
looking into the wording of the relevant provisions of the Company Law, the 
list of documents that can be inspected does seem to be exhaustive rather 
 
 56. See discussion supra Part II.B.  
 57. See discussion supra Part III.C.3.  
 58. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(c) (West). 
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than indicative.  Hence, this paper suggests that China should allow some 
flexibility in relation to the scope of documents to be inspected, by 
introducing a general provision to the relevant provisions of the Company 
Law.  Drawing on the Delaware experience, the general provision can 
stipulate that the document must be essential to the relevant purpose and the 
court has the discretion to attach certain conditions. 
 
C.  Preventing Abuse of the Rights 
 
1.  The “Proper Purpose” Rule 
 
As the main tool to prevent abuse of shareholder inspection rights, there 
is a ‘proper purpose’ rule, under which a stockholder must have a proper 
purpose for making his inspection.  Conceptually, this requirement sounds 
straightforward but can be very difficult to apply in practice.   
As discussed earlier, Chinese law explicitly lists two categories of 
corporate documents that can be inspected, and based on this categorization, 
provides for a bifurcated approach to the requirement of proper purpose.  The 
requirement of proper purpose is not attached to the first category of 
documents and only applies to the second category of corporate documents, 
namely accounting books. 
Furthermore, when a shareholder requests to inspect the second 
category of information such as accounting books, the company can reject 
the request on the grounds that the inspection is for improper purposes.  
Through the empirical study noted earlier, we found that when requesting 
relevant information, the plaintiff shareholders just need to state that they 
make the request for the general purposes of knowing the operational and 
financial situation of the company, and then it is the defendants’ burden to 
prove that the plaintiffs seek information for improper purposes.  This 
effectively shift the burden of proof to the defendant company to establish 
the existence of improper purpose.  As revealed by our empirical study, it is 
very difficult for the defendant company to discharge this burden to the 
satisfaction of the court.59  
By contrast, as a substantive rule, Delaware law requires proper purpose 
not only in relation to accounting books but also other types of corporate 
documents.  Then, depending on the type of documents sought to be 
inspected, Delaware bifurcates the allocations of the burden of proof for the 
requirement of proper purpose.  Unlike Chinese law, however, Delaware 
draws the line between the stock ledger and all other books and records.  
Specifically, when the requested document is a stock ledger, the requesting 
 
 59. See discussion supra Part IV.C.1.  
1 - Huang HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2020  8:41 AM 
2021] Shareholder Inspection Rights in China 33 
shareholder only needs to allege a proper purpose in general terms, and then 
the company bears the burden of proving the purpose to be improper.  Where 
the shareholder seeks to inspect other documents such as accounting books, 
such a shareholder has the burden of proving his purpose to be proper.60 The 
evidentiary standard is a “credible basis” one which is seen as an important 
safeguard against “fishing expeditions.”61  Plainly, due to this difference in 
the allocation of evidentiary burden, it is usually harder to gain access to 
other documents than the stock ledger. 
Hence, it appears that compared with China, Delaware places a higher 
degree of restriction on inspection rights.  First, for the least sensitive 
corporate documents such as the shareholder list, there is no explicit 
requirement of proper purpose under Chinese law, but the requirement still 
applies under Delaware law.  The burden of proof is shifted to the company, 
so it needs to prove the purpose of the shareholder to be improper.  Second, 
for more sensitive documents such as accounting books, Chinese law applies 
the requirement of proper purpose and shifts the burden of proof to the 
company, just like Delaware law regulates the request for the shareholder 
list.  Under Delaware law, the requesting shareholder has the burden to prove 
that his purpose is proper.  In sum, the shareholder faces a lower barrier to 
obtaining access to corporate documents in China than Delaware.  As 
discussed elsewhere, this may be explained on the grounds that due to the 
special role of the state in the Chinese corporate landscape, Chinese 
corporate governance is pro-shareholder while the U.S. one is pro-
management, in terms of the allocation of corporate power, including 
shareholder inspection rights.62  
 
2.  The “Substantial Deprivation” Rule 
 
Another way to restrict inspection rights takes the form of restrictive 
corporate constitutional provisions or shareholder agreements.  It is very 
difficult to determine whether such restrictions can be allowed.  On the one 
hand, corporate constitutional provisions or shareholder agreements may be 
seen as contractual arrangements amongst shareholders, embodying the 
spirit of corporate autonomy.  On the other hand, the interests of 
shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, would be harmed if 
inspection rights were to be restricted by the shareholders at will.  Indeed, 
from a policy perspective, there is a need to strike a balance between 
 
 60. Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220(c) (West). 
 61. Seinfeld, 909 A.2d at 122.  
 62. See Huang & Thomas, supra note 2 at 943-944. 
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managerial accountability by way of inspection rights and managerial 
authority by insulating managers from too much shareholder interference.   
As discussed earlier, Chinese law stipulates that a shareholder of a 
company cannot be substantially deprived of their inspection rights by the 
company’s bylaws or any agreement between shareholders.63  In the U.S., 
the issue is framed in terms of the reasonableness of a restriction that can be 
imposed on the inspection right.  Despite the difference in their expressions, 
they are functionally equivalent in that an instance of substantial deprivation 
in China would well be considered to be unreasonable in the U.S., and vice 
versa.  
An often-discussed restriction in the U.S. is the requirement that the 
requesting shareholder must own at least 5% of the outstanding shares of the 
corporation and/or hold the stock for at least six months immediately 
preceding his demand for access to corporate documents.  The theory behind 
this is that shareholders with large or long-term commitments to the 
corporation are more likely to have proper motives for their exercise of 
inspection rights.  Indeed, without the 5% ownership requirement and the 
six-month holding requirement, inspection rights might be abused by some 
persons who can strategically buy a symbolic number of shares just before 
requesting for access to corporate documents.  However, the concern is 
whether the requirements may unfairly harm the rights of shareholders, 
particularly minority shareholders.  
In Delaware, as the statute contains no minimum ownership or holding 
period requirements, the courts have traditionally disallowed a corporation 
to contractually impose such conditions on the inspection rights of its 
stockholders.  For instance, the Delaware Court of Chancery held void a 25% 
minimum ownership requirement for inspection rights contained in the 
certificate of incorporation.64  Conceivably, the 25% ownership requirement 
set the bar too high to be reasonable, but how about 5%, or even 1%t?  
Indeed, before 2008, the Model Business Corporations Act had a 5% 
ownership or six moth holding requirement for the inspection rights, which 
are still adopted in some states in the U.S.65  However, after 2008, the MBCA 
dropped the ownership and holding requirement, which has been followed 
by some states.  In short, the states in the U.S. are divided on this issue and 
the debate is in a state of flux. 
Hence, it is a very difficult issue to determine the validity of contractual 
restrictions on inspection rights.  Inevitably, the court needs to exercise 
discretion with regards to the form and effect of the restriction in individual 
 
 63. See discussion supra part II.B. 
 64. See Loew’s Theatres, Inc. v. Commercial Credit Co., 243 A.2d 78 (Del. Ch. 1968). 
 65. See Browning Jeffries, Shareholder Access to Corporate Books and Records: The 
Abrogation Debate, 59 DRAKE L. REV. 1087, 1103-1113 (2011). 
1 - Huang HICLR 44-1 (Do Not Delete) 12/7/2020  8:41 AM 
2021] Shareholder Inspection Rights in China 35 
cases.  As shown by the empirical study of the cases in China, it is not yet 
common to impose restrictions on the inspection rights through the company 
bylaws and shareholder resolutions, and no sample case was found to have 
restrictions by way of the ownership and holding period requirement.66  
Hence, at present, it does not seem to be a pressing issue in China over what 
constitutes “substantial deprivation.”  This may change in the future, 
however, as the inspection right becomes more frequently used, and thus 
more companies may choose to restrict the exercise of this right through 
constitutional provisions or shareholder agreements. 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Shareholder inspection rights provide an important channel for 
shareholders to gain access to relevant documents of their company, thus 
enabling them to engage in corporate governance to monitor the 
management and if necessary, take appropriate action.  Drawing upon 
overseas experiences, notably the US, China has introduced the legal regime 
for shareholder inspection rights in the early stage of development of its 
company law.  Over the years, China has provided more details on the 
relevant legal provisions and made amendments intended to better suit the 
local conditions.   
Apart from the law, this paper also conducts an empirical study of how 
the law has been applied in practice by examining relevant cases adjudicated 
from 2012 to 2017.  These main findings include:  
 
1) Recently, a fair amount of shareholder inspection rights have been 
utilized, with a significant increase in the cases filed in recent years. 
 
2) This means a much smaller number of “subsequent” cases are filed by the 
same plaintiff against the same defendants, when compared to the U.S.  
This shows the inspection right in China plays a less important role as a 
tool to collect relevant evidence to bring subsequent cases.  Furthermore, 
within the small number of subsequent cases, class actions and derivative 
actions represent a high proportion of cases in the U.S. but are absent in 
China.   
 
3) The appeal rate of inspection cases is significantly higher than the overall 
appeal rate for corporate law cases, indicating that they involve 
contentious issues.  
 
 
 66. See discussion supra Part III.D.2. 
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4) A vast majority of inspection cases were brought by individual 
shareholders as opposed to corporate shareholders, suggesting that 
inspection rights are of particular value to small and vulnerable 
shareholders. Furthermore, the plaintiffs with a shareholding level 
between 10% and 30% filed most of the inspection cases.  
 
5) Up to 94.81% of inspection cases were found in the context of the limited 
liability company, which corresponds to the private company or the close 
corporation in overseas jurisdictions.  In contrast, a small number of cases 
were brought in the context of SOEs, while most cases were found in the 
context of small companies because they generally have weaker corporate 
governance.  
 
6) The information requested can be broadly divided into four categories, 
and there has been a clear trend towards the request of accounting 
materials, including accounting books and original accounting vouchers. 
 
7) In a very small number of cases, the company successfully refused 
shareholder inspection rights by proving the “improper purpose” of the 
requesting shareholders.  Among the four types of “improper purpose,” 
th first one, “the shareholder is engaged in any business in substantial 
competition with the main business of the company,” is most likely to get 
the court’s support.  
 
8) In only three cases, the company sought to restrict the shareholders’ 
inspection right through the bylaws or the shareholders’ agreement, and 
in only one case, the restriction was found to constitute “substantial 
deprivation” and thus invalid. 
 
The paper reveals that there are similarities and differences between 
China and the U.S. (as represented by Delaware) in the area of shareholder 
inspection rights.  Despite the different types of agency problems in 
corporate governance between China and the U.S., shareholder inspection 
rights are similarly useful in mitigating informational asymmetry and 
facilitating shareholder engagement.  Some of the differences, such as those 
on the number and types of subsequent litigation, can be explained by the 
different patterns of corporate governance strategies as well as different 
corporate litigation regimes between the two jurisdictions.   
This paper also discovers that there are some significant differences in 
the key elements of the legal framework for shareholder inspection rights 
between the two jurisdictions, and based on this, sets out improvement 
suggestions for China.  For instance, this paper suggests China to consider 
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adopting the Delaware experience to allow the shareholder of a parent 
company to inspect the relevant materials of the subsidiary company; China 
is also advised to allow more flexibility in the use of agents to inspect 
corporate documents in line with the Delaware practice; it is also suggested 
that China should introduce a general provision on the scope of corporate 
documents that can be inspected.  There are some issues that may need 
further research in the future, such as the issue of what constitutes 
“substantial deprivation” of shareholder inspection rights through 
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